

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8049

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MBFR CAPITALS 242

USNMR SHAPE

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USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO II

USMISSION GENEVA

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GENEVA FOR DISTO

USMISSION NATO TAKE AS PRIORITY

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: MBFR: MARCH 14 DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN REPS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE MARCH 14 CONTINUATION OF THE EXPLORATORY EXCHANGE ON THE STATUS OF HUNGARY, HELD AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY, WAS WIDE- RANGING, RELAXED IN ATMOSPHERE, AND AGAIN INCONCLUSIVE, WITH A FURTHER MEETING PLANNED FOR THE MORNING OF MARCH 16.

2. SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV, KVITSINSKIY, AND TIMERBAYEV
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AND HUNGARIAN REP USTOR PARTICIPATED, TOGETHER WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND US REPS. THE SOVIETS INDICATED

INTEREST IN FURTHER IDENTIFYING DECISION- MAKING PARTICIPANTS AS " POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS." THE HUNGARIAN REP RETURNED TO THE CONCEPT THAT THE LIST OF 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A STATEMENT THAT, ON THE AGREEMENT OF THESE PARTICIPANTS AND THE STATE CONCERNED, OTHERS MIGHT BE COOPTED AS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. TIMERBAYEV PROPOSED THAT SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT BE COMPLEMENTED WITH A STATEMENT THAT FUTURE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES, ASSERTING THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD MEET ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS WITH REGARD TO HUNGARY. KVITSINSKIY INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT OF SUBSTANCE TO LIMIT INCREASES IN FOREIGN TROOPS IN BOTH HUNGARY AND ITALY. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO LIST ALL 19 PARTICIPANTS AND FOLLOW THIS BY A STATEMENT THAT THERE WERE 11 POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT SPECIFYING THESE BY NAME AND WITHOUT LISTING OR DESCRIBING THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO URGE THEIR PROPOSALS FROM THE PREVIOUS DAY, POINTING OUT THAT THE ONLY OPEN ISSUE WAS HUNGARY, STATING THAT ITALY COULD NOT BE A DIRECT PARTICIPANT, AND THAT LISTING HUNGARY AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT WOULD PREJUDICE ALLIED INTERESTS. THEY MENTIONED THE CONCEPT OF POSSIBLE UNILATERAL STATEMENTS BY THE ALLIED BUT THE SOVIETS REACTED SOMEWHAT NEGATIVELY. IN SUM, THE CONVERSATION TURNED UP SOME NEW THOUGHTS, BUT NONE WERE PURSUED FAR ENOUGH ON THIS OCCASION TO GIVE A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF THEIR DETAILS OR PERMIT SERIOUS ASSESSMENT OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. END SUMMARY.

3. HUNGARIAN REP USTOR APPEARED AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY FOR THE SCHEDULED DISCUSSION ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 14 IN ADVANCE OF THE SOVIETS. IN CASUAL CONVERSATION WHILE AWAITING THEIR ARRIVAL, HE TOLD NETHERLANDS AND US REPS THAT HE HAD FORWARDED THE ALLIED PROPOSALS OF THE PREVIOUS DAY TO HIS AUTHORITIES AND HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS AND POSSIBLY WOULD NOT DO SO FOR A SECRET

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DAY OR SO.

4. FOLLOWING ARRIVAL OF THE SOVIET REPS, NETHERLANDS REP WELCOMED THE EASTERN REPS AND SAID THERE HAD BEEN AN INTERESTING DISCUSSION OF THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE ON THE PREVIOUS DAY IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO TRY TO SEEK A NEUTRAL COMPROMISE SOLUTION. HE HOPED THE EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN THINKING OVER THE ISSUE AND WOULD HAVE SOME PROPOSALS OF THEIR

OWN TO MAKE.

5. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD SOME THOUGHTS HE WISHED TO ADVANCE. THE PREVIOUS DAY'S DISCUSSION HAD BEEN A USEFUL ONE. THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT CERTAIN VIEWS WERE HELD IN COMMON, AS HE HAD SPECIFIED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE SOVIETS HAD NOTED THE ALLIED STATEMENT THAT THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WAS TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN EXCHANGE OF PERSONAL IDEAS AND THAT ALL SIDES WERE PREPARED TO THINK BROADLY ON THAT BASIS. THE SOVIETS HAD ALSO NOTED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS REP THAT THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO EXAMINE VARIOUS POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT THE PREVIOUS DAY'S PRESENTATION REPRESENTED PRELIMINARY THINKING ON THE ALLIED SIDE. THE SOVIETS WISHED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE ALLIED VIEWS AND CONCEPTS. HE HAD SOME QUESTIONS WHICH WERE NOT NECESSARILY IN ORDER OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE.

6. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM THE REMARKS OF THE ALLIED

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USNMR SHAPE

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FROM US REP MBFR

SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY THIS GROUP AS DECISION- MAKERS. IF THE SOVIETS WISHED, WE COULD IDENTIFY THEM ALSO AS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. MOREOVER, THE ALLIED PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE A DISCLAIMER WITH REGARD TO HUNGARY HAD THE EFFECT OF PUTTING THE STATUS OF THE OTHER 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN CLEARER RELIEF. IF THIS WAS THE SOVIET DESIRE, THEY SHOULD ACCEPT THE ALLIED PROPOSITION AND WRITE IT IN AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 1. KVITSINSKIY SAID IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO CALL THE DECISION- MAKER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THEIR IDENTITY SHOULD BE SPECIFIED MORE CLEARLY. THE PAPER SHOULD
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SAY WHY THEY SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO TAKE FUTURE DECISIONS. UNLESS THIS WAS STATED, THERE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RELEGATING THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS TO PARAGRAPH 2. THE LATTER GROUP WOULD HAVE A SECOND CLASS STATUS BECAUSE NO REASON WOULD HAVE BEEN STATED FOR THE DIVISION INTO THE TWO GROUPS.

9. KHESTOV ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIED REPS ON THIS POTENTIAL FORMULATION WHICH HE CALLED " AN ALLIED FORMULATION." US REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES HAD HAD ENOUGH OF KHESTOV' S TRICKS REGARDING THE ANTECEDENTS OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS. WHAT KHESTOV HAD ADVANCED WAS A SOVIET IDEA AND SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH. KHESTOV REPLIED THAT HE PREFERRED TO CARRY ON THE PRESENT INFORMAL TALKS WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THE ANTECEDENTS OF ANY CONCEPTS ADVANCED. THEY SHOULD BE " FATHERLESS", SO NO ONE' S INTEREST WOULD BE PREJUDICED. HE ASKED AGAIN FOR ALLIED REACTION TO THE FORMULA HE HAD PROPOSED. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS WAS ADEQUATELY SET FORTH IN THE ALLIED PAPER, BUT THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT EXAMINE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FURTHER.

10. KHESTOV SAID HE HAD A SECOND QUESTION. WHY DID THE ALLIED THINK THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIETS AND HUNGARY AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO INCLUDE ITALY AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IF HUNGARY WERE INCLUDED HAD BEEN ADVANCED PURELY FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES? THE SOVIETS COULD NOT FIGURE THIS ONE OUT. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED ITALY AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT, THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED AND HAD THEN RAISED THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE. THEN, AS THEY GOT INTO DIFFICULTIES, THEY HAD DRAGGED IN ITALY, CREATING AN ARTIFICIAL PROBLEM IN A VERY OBVIOUS WAY. ONLY THE

PREVIOUS DAY, KHLESTOV HAD INDICATED THAT THE PREFERENCE OF THE SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN FOR THE EXCLUSION OF HUNGARY FROM THE LIST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS INDICATED THE BASIC POSITION OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES. ITALY HAD BEEN THROWN IN MERELY AS A BARGAINING POINT. WE SHOULD GET RID OF THIS POINT. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT ITALY DID NOT WISH TO BE A DIRECT PARTICIPANT AND THERE WAS
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NO WAY OF CHANGING THIS. ONLY THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY WAS IN DISPUTE. HENCE, THE ONLY QUESTION CALLING FOR A NEUTRAL SOLUTION WAS THE HUNGARIAN ONE.

11. US REP SAID THERE WAS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CASE OF ITALY AND THAT OF HUNGARY. THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED ITALY FROM THE OUTSET AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT. THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO THIS STATUS FOR ITALY AND THE OTHER ALLIED FLANK STATES IN THEIR NOTES OF REPLY. AS THE SOVIETS KNEW, ITALY AND ALL HER ALLIES INSISTED ON RETENTION OF THIS STATUS. SINCE THAT TIME, THE SOVIETS HAD ALSO AGREED TO SPECIAL STATUS FOR ROMANIA AND BULGARIA. THIS MEANT THAT THE STATUS OF ALL SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE TALKS. LIKEWISE, THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT BELGIUM, CANADA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR, FRG, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, POLAND, UK, USSR AND USA WOULD BE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BY A CLEAR AND LOGICAL PROCESS OF ELIMINATION, ONLY THE STATUS OF HUNGARY REMAINED IN QUESTION. THE ALLIES ALL WANT HUNGARY AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. THE SOVIETS AND THEIR FRIENDS DO NOT. THAT IS WHY WE HAD TO FIND A COMPROMISE.

12. KVITSINSKIY SAID THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF TALK FROM THE ALLIED SIDE ABOUT THE STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE ALLIES WITH REGARD TO HUNGARY. JUST WHAT WERE THESE STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS AS THEY CONCERNED HUNGARY? US REP SAID THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH REGARD TO HUNGARY. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE SUCH INTERESTS. THE ALLIES HAD POINTED OUT THAT THEIR PROPOSAL THAT THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE BE KEPT IN ABEYANCE WAS INTENDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT AND AT THE VERY LEAST TO ASSURE THESE SECURITY INTERESTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING THE PENDING NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT NO ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE IN THE INTERIM WITH REGARD TO PARTICIPATION WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THIS POSSIBILITY. THE SOVIETS SHOULD LOGICALLY HAVE AS GREAT AN INTEREST IN ASSURING THIS OUTCOME AS THE ALLIES. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THIS MIGHT BE TRUE ENOUGH BUT ON THE PREVIOUS DAY THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD SAID THE ALLIES HAD SECURITY INTERESTS WITH REGARD

TO HUNGARY. WHAT ARE THESE SECURITY INTERESTS? WHAT
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WAS THEIR SPECIFIC NATURE? US AND NETHERLANDS REPS
SAID THAT SUCH ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
PROPER. IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SAY AT THE
MOMENT THAT THERE WERE SUCH INTERESTS. THE EXISTENCE
OF SUCH INTERESTS WAS WHY THE ALLIES PROPOSED LEAVING
THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE OPEN IN A NEUTRAL WAY. WE SHOULD
NOT GO BEYOND THIS AT PRESENT.

13. KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD
IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS
TOLD HIM THAT THE ALLIES CONSIDERED HUNGARY A POTENTIAL
AREA FOR THE ACCUMULATION OF SOVIET FORCES AND THAT
THIS SHOULD BE BLOCKED AND THAT THE LEVEL OF SOVIET

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FORCES IN HUNGARY SHOULD BE FROZEN. NETHERLANDS REP
SAID HIS PERSONAL REMARKS HAD ONLY MEANT THERE SHOULD

BE SOME LIMIT TO THE INCREASE OF SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY IN SOME NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT. KVITSINSKIY SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO DO THIS IF THE ALLIES WOULD APPLY THE SAME LIMITATIONS IN ITALY. KHESTOV SAID THAT IF IT WAS IN THEORY POSSIBLE TO APPLY SUCH LIMITATIONS TO HUNGARY, THEN IN ALL JUSTICE THEY SHOULD BE APPLIED ALSO TO ITALY.

14. KVITSIMSKIY THEN WHIPPED OUT A MAP OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND SAID THAT IN A SITUATION OF POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY IN THE EVENT OF WAR, THE ALLIES MIGHT BRING REINFORCEMENTS TO CENTRAL EUROPE FROM ITALY, GOING THROUGH AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND. THERE WERE 8 MAIN HIGHWAYS TRAVERSING AUSTRIA
SECRET

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AND SWITZERLAND INTO GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND DID NOT EVEN HAVE INTERNATIONALLY AN AGREED NEUTRAL STATUS PREVENING FOREIGN FORCES FROM TRAVERSING ITS TERRITORY. IF THE ALLIES CLAIMED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR SOVIET FORCES TO VIOLATE AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY AND TO MOVE WEST INTO BAVARIA, THEN THE SAME POSSIBILITY EXISTED FOR ALLIED TROOPS COMING FROM ITALY. THE SAME SITUATION PERTAINED IN BOTH CASES. KVITSINSKIY CLAIMED THAT ALLIED FEARS THAT SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO REINFORCE WARSAW PACT FORCES STATIONED THERE WOULD NOT MAKE MILITARY SENSE. SUCH FORCES WOULD FALL ALL OVER OTHER ADVANCING WARSAW PACT FORCES IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. THE WHOLE ALLIED POSITION WAS ILLOGICAL. IF THE ALLIES WANTED ITALY AS A FLANK STATE, THEN IT WOULD BE LOGICAL FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO CLAIM THAT POLAND WAS THEIR NORTHERN FLANK STATE. IF HUNGARY WERE TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE SCOPE OF AGREEMENTS, ITALY WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN TOO, TO THE SAME EXTENT, WHATEVER THAT EXTENT MIGHT BE.

15. US REP SAID ONE COULD CONTEND IN THEORY THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION AS A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE, BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE A DEGREE OF DETAIL AND PREVISION WHICH WOULD OVERBURDEN THE PRESENT TALKS. THE EASIEST WAY TO TAKE CARE OF THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES WAS TO KEEP THE STATUS OF HUNGARY OPEN UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN SUCH MATTERS COULD BE MORE PROFITABLY ADDRESSED, POSSIBLY STATING SPECIFICALLY THAT THEY WOULD BE ADDRESSED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

16. KVITSINSKIY ASKED WHY THE ALLIES WANTED HUNGARY IN. ALLIED REPS HAD NOT YET STATED THE NATURE OF SECURITY INTERESTS. THE NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHETHER KVITSINSKIY WANTED TO HAVE AN INTENSIVE

DISCUSSION OF TOPICS OF SUBSTANCE AT PRESENT. THIS SHOULD BE HELD OVER TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. KVITSINSKIY RESPONDED " TO THE DEGREE HUNGARY IS IN, ITALY IS IN. THIS IS HONEST BARGAINING."

17. HUNARIAN REP STATED THAT WHAT EMERGED FROM THIS DISCUSSION WAS THAT, IF IT WERE IN FACT AGREED THAT 11 COUNTRIES WOULD BE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THERE WAS A QUESTION AS TO WHICH
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OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT IN THE FUTURE BE ADDED TO THEIR RANKS. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS TO LEAVE OPEN ONLY THE ISSUE OF HUNGARY. IN HIS VIEW, THIS DID NOT SEEM A TRULY NEUTRAL APPROACH IN THE TRUE SENSE OF THAT TERM. A MORE NEUTRAL APPROACH WOULD BE TO LIST THE 11 AGREED PARTICIPANTS AND THEN TO STATE THAT OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BE ADDED TO THIS GROUP BY COMMON AGREEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING THE NAMES OF ANY COUNTRY, LEAVING OPEN TO A LATER STAGE THE ISSUE OF WHICH THOSE COUNTRIES MIGHT BE. THE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT AGREE TO INVITE OTHERS AT SOME POINT. (IN AN ASIDE AT THIS POINT, TIMERBAYEV COMMENTED TO NETHERLANDS REP THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION.) A FORMULATION OF THIS KIND, WHICH USTOR ADVANCED WITHOUT COMMITMENT, WOULD IN FACT BE A MORE NEUTRAL APPROACH.

18. US REP SAID THAT SINCE THE ALLIES HAD GONE TO THE EXTENT OF MAKING A PROPOSAL ON HOW THE STATUS OF HUNGARY COULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR LATER RESOLUTION, IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO HEAR SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW SUCH A STEP COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ASSURANCES WHICH WOULD CREATE CONFIDENCE FOR THE ALLIES THAT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED. TIMERBAYEV PROPOSED THAT A FURTHER FORMULATION BE ADDED TO THAT PROPOSED BY USTOR TO THE EFFECT THAT AGREEMENTS REACHED SHOULD NOT BE SUCH THAT THEY WOULD PREJUDICE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITHER PARTY. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD OBVIOUSLY COVER THE ALLIED INTEREST IN HUNGARY WITHOUT SPECIFYING HUNGARY BY NAME. US REP SAID THAT SUCH A STATEMENT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE TOO GENERAL TO COVER ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS WITH REGARD TO HUNGARY.

19. KHLESTOV SAID THE ALLIES APPARENTLY WANTED A FORMULA WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO DISCUSS THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF HUNGARY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO PROTECT ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS FOR THE FUTURE. THE SOVIETS WANTED THE SAME RIGHTS FOR THEMSELVES. WHAT ABOUT ASSURING SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS? IT WOULD SEEM IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION ON THE KIND OF BASIS WHICH WAS BEING PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES. INSTEAD, A TRULY NEUTRAL APPROACH SHOULD BE FOUND.

20. THE HUNGARIAN REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES HAD ADVANCED THREE PROPOSITIONS WHICH MENTIONED HUNGARY SPECIFICALLY. COULD THE ALLIES IMAGINE ANOTHER FORM OF WORDS WHICH DID NOT MENTION HUNGARY

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SPECIFICALLY BUT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED THEIR INTERESTS? WHAT ABOUT SAYING THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ENLARGE THE GROUP OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BY COMMON CONSENT? US REP SAID NONE OF THE ALLIED FLANKS WANTED TO ENTER THE LIST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS WAS A POLITICAL FACT WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHETHER A FORMULA WERE ENVISAGED WHICH DID NOT MENTION PARTICIPANTS SPECIFICALLY. IN SUCH A CASE, WOULD THE HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE BE PREPARED TO MAKE AN ORAL STATEMENT THAT THE QUESTION OF HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR LATER RESOLUTION? KHLESTOV

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SAID IF THERE WAS A STATEMENT ABOUT HUNGARY, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A STATEMENT ABOUT ITALY. THE HUNGARIAN REP SAID HUNGARY DID NOT WANT TO TAKE ACTION ALONE WITHOUT OTHER PARTICIPANTS ALSO DOING SO.

21. NETHERLANDS REP SAID WHAT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD SAY WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT HUNGARY

?

US REP SUGGESTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO LANGUAGE IN THE TEXT KEEPING OPEN THE HUNGARIAN ISSUES, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE UNCONTESTED UNILATERAL STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT MATTER SAYING WHY THEY WERE INTERESTED IN LEAVING THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION OPEN. KHLESTOV SAID IN THAT EVENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO MAKE A SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF THEIR OWN. IT WAS MORE USUAL IN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE FOR BOTH SIDES TO MAKE STATEMENTS IN SUCH CASES. THE NETHERLANDS REP POINTED OUT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION IN WHICH THERE WAS NO SECRET

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SPECIAL MENTION OF HUNGARY ON PAPER AND THAT THERE MIGHT INSTEAD BE AN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES.

22. US REP SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE A WRITTEN STATEMENT IN WHICH EACH SIDE SET FORTH ITS DIVERGENT VIEW ON THE STATUS OF HUNGARY OR THERE COULD BE ORAL STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT.

23. KVITSINSKY SAID HE WAS EXCEEDING INSTRUCTIONS IN MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL, BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE A SOLUTION IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A LIST OF 19 PARTICIPANTS AND A SECOND PARAGRAPH WHICH MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND DEFINED THEIR QUALITIES BUT DID NOT LIST THEM INDIVIDUALLY, AND THEN TO GO ON IN THE PROCEDURES PAPER WITHOUT MAKING ANY LIST OF THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS OR STATING THEIR ATTRIBUTIONS. THE NETHERLANDS AND US REPS OBJECTED THAT THIS WOULD LEAVE THE STATUS OF THE REMAINING 7 PARTICIPANTS UNCLEAR, BY IMPLICATION GIVING HUNGARY THE STATUS OF A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WOULD BE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT, BUT THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS CONCEPT WOULD BE THAT IT WOULD NOT MENTION THE POINT IN SO MANY WORDS. HUNGARIAN REP SAID HUNGARY COULD NOT BE MENTIONED IN DISCRIMINATING AGAINST HUNGARY. INDEED, THE STATUS THEY FORESAW FOR HUNGARY UNDER THEIR PROPOSAL WAS A PREFERRED ONE. HUNGARY WOULD HAVE ALL THE RIGHTS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT TO THE EXTENT IT WISHED TO AVAIL ITSELF OF THEM. USTOR OPPOSED SAYING THIS WOULD STILL BE SINGLING OUT HUNGARY.

24. THE NETHERLANDS REP MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY THAT DISCUSSION OF THE HUNGARIAN TOPIC WOULD CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AND RAISED THE IDEA OF POSSIBLE PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER ITEMS, SUCH AS AGENDA. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT RESOLVING THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE THAT HARD AND THAT HE BELIEVED THE PRESENT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE AN OUTCOME.

25. KHLESTOV SAID HE THOUGHT THE DISCUSSION HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT COULD ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, IT HAD BEEN USEFUL, AND HE HOPED IT COULD BE CONTINUED. THE NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD THINK FURTHER IN THE EFFORT TO COME TO A COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE. IT WAS AGREED TO RESUME

THE DISCUSSION ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 16 AT THE HUNGARIAN EMBASSY.
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Status: <DBA CORRECTED> jms 971208
Subject: MBFR: MARCH 14 DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN REPS
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE INFO SECDEF
MBFR CAPITALS
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
USCINCEUR
SALT TWO II
GENEVA

Type: TE

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